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STATE COURTS AND REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT
Hans A. Linde*
I. THE CONSTITUTION'S CHARGE TO STATE JUDGES AND
OFFICIALS
Do California judges and officials have any obligation to
maintain a republican form of government? And is this
obligation relevant to California's initiative system?
The answer is yes to both questions. The legal reasons,
as a matter of constitutional text and history, are quite
straightforward. Readiness to act on them is another matter.
A. Maintaining Republican Governance as the "Supreme
Law of the Land"
The Constitution assumes that each state enters the
union with a republican form of government, and it directs
the United States to guarantee that state governments
remain republican. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance required
it for new states, and it was axiomatic for the Philadelphia
Convention. Introducing the eleventh resolution of Virginia's
plan for the proposed union, Governor Randolph stated that
the resolution had "two objects: first, to secure a republican
government [and] secondly, to suppress domestic
commotions."' Later, Randolph proposed, with James
Madison's second, to state even more clearly that "no State be
at liberty to form any other than a republican government," a
principle that James Wilson then rephrased with their
* J.D., University of California, Berkeley; B.A., Reed College. The author
is Senior Judge, Oregon Supreme Court; Distinguished Scholar in Residence,
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1. 5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
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consent as a guarantee.
The Guarantee Clause imposes a secondary, derivative
duty on the United States, but the primary responsibility for
republican institutions is on each state. There would be no
cause to direct the union to intervene in a state's government
if the states were at liberty to adopt non-republican forms.
The U.S. Supreme Court only stated the obvious in 1874
when it wrote that the clause "necessarily implies a duty of
the States themselves to provide such a government."3 I
doubt that anyone has denied this. It is each state's most
fundamental duty to the nation and to its citizens. As the
California Constitution itself expressly recognizes, statehood
makes the federal Constitution a part of every state's law.4
Compliance with a constitutional duty falls to the
officials who act for the state, including its governor, attorney
general, secretary of state, and all others who must swear to
uphold the constitutions of the United States and of the
state.5  But even more, the federal Supremacy Clause
explicitly holds the states' judges responsible for the officials'
compliance. The Constitution is "the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."6 The Supremacy Clause does not
allow a state's judges to duck a federal legal challenge even to
the very constitution of their state. In principle, then, the
judges in every state are bound to consider claims that their
state has departed from republican government. Indeed,
state judges used to do this often and sometimes still do.
Many such claims are unrelated to initiatives. They may
involve an excess of placing the state's lawmaking power in a
single executive-an echo of eighteenth century monarchy.
2. "That a republican form of government shall be guaranteed to each
State, and that each State shall be protected against foreign and domestic
violence." Id.
3. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874).
4. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 1. This incorporation into the California
Constitution further meets any doubts about the propriety of state court
enforcement. See Ernest L. Graves, The Guarantee Clause in California: State
Constitutional Limits on Initiatives Changing the California Constitution, 31
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1305, 1306-09 (1998).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before
mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive
and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution. ..
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
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Let me cite a few modem examples. Thirty years ago, Kansas
amended its constitution to reorganize executive departments
subject only to legislative disapproval rather than prior
authorization. The Kansas Supreme Court called squaring
this change with the Guarantee Clause "the decisive question
in the case," and it sustained the amendment after a lengthy
review of James Madison's writings on the tests of republican
government.7
About the same time, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
decided that republican government does not require a strict
separation of executive and judicial powers.8 The same
conclusion was announced in Colorado9 and in Rhode Island. 10
In a 1991 opinion, Oklahoma's justices overcame their
concern with republican government and allowed a
constitutional proposal to refer all future revenue bills to the
voters." These and other modern opinions faced and disposed
of the issue on the merits. 2 Other state courts, however, have
denied not only their duty but their power to hear claims that
a state law or process departs from the republican governance
that is "the supreme Law of the Land."
What explains this division among the judges?
B. Trading Analysis for an Adjective: "Non-justiciable"
1. History of Confusion: The Pacific States Telephone
Case
The confusion stems directly from the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1912 decision in Pacific States Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.3 The company challenged a tax
enacted by the initiative process and invoked the guarantee of
republican forms of government. The Oregon Supreme Court
7. VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223, 235 (Kan. 1973).
8. See State v. Lehtola, 198 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 1972) (powers of district
attorneys).
9. See In re Interrogatories Propounded by the Senate Concerning House
Bill 1078, 536 P.2d 3308 (Colo. 1975) (validity of judicial role in redistricting).
10. See In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 612 A.2d 1, 15-16 (R.I. 1992)
(lawmaking power of state ethics commission).
11. See In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1991).
12. See Cagle v. Qualified Electors of Winston, 470 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. 1985)
(challenge to a "special law" for a county referendum); Walling v. North Cent.
Tex. Mun. Water Auth., 359 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (challenge to a
local district scheme of representation).
13. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
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considered and rejected the argument on the merits, for
reasons we will consider later. What did the U.S. Supreme
Court do?
The Court dismissed the company's writ of error for lack
of jurisdiction-that is, its own jurisdiction to decide this
issue. It read the words "The United States" in the
Guarantee Clause to place the onus for keeping the state
governments republican on the federal political branches
rather than the federal courts. This allocation of federal
power made the guarantee "not justiciable" in the Supreme
Court. 4 The Court did not endorse direct legislation as
"republican," having denied its own jurisdiction to consider
the question. Logically, that decision would be the same if
the Oregon court had invalidated the initiative as non-
republican-unless the Supreme Court had then chosen to
assert its jurisdiction. Justice White's opinion nonetheless
continued with extravagant assertions about the company's
claim-that it would invalidate Oregon's entire government
and all its acts-assertions that any competent attorney or
court can distinguish or dismiss for the dicta they were.
In any event, Pacific States held nothing to cast doubt on
Oregon's own responsibility for its republican institutions.
The Supreme Court did not cast doubt on that responsibility.
It did not hold that the Oregon courts lacked jurisdiction to
decide how the initiative squared with republican lawmaking.
The Court did not hold (and, having denied its own
jurisdiction, it could not hold) that the Oregon court should
have dismissed the company's claim rather than decided it.
Pacific States did not touch the state judges' responsibility for
testing their states' adherence to republican governance.
The opinion's rhetoric, however, created confusion in the
state courts. Some early state cases after Pacific States
continued to decide Guarantee Clause claims." Other state
courts, including one California intermediate court, began to
dismiss such claims as "non-justiciable" with simple citations
to Pacific States, without analyzing whether that opinion
decided anything about the authority of state courts.' 6 Some
14. Id. at 151.
15. See, e.g., State ex rel. Foote v. Board of Comm'rs, 144 P. 241 (Kan. 1914);
Breedlove v. Suttles, 188 S.E. 140 (Ga. 1936).
16. State v. Mountain Timber Co., 135 P. 645, 649 (Wash. 1913), afrd, 243
U.S. 219 (1917); Borden v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 123 So. 655 (La. 1929),
followed in Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 123 So. 664 (La. 1929),
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courts have chosen to note the question of justiciability and
still deal with the claim of non-republican government
action. 7 The Oregon court, whose decision on the merits the
Supreme Court had left standing, later seesawed between
reading Pacific States to foreclose review in 1954,18 to stating
the correct analysis in 1990,'9 and back again in 1997."0
"Non-justiciable," of course, is a conclusion, not a premise
for a conclusion. To say that a court may not decide a legal
issue because it is "non-justiciable" is no explanation at all.
The Supreme Court's premise for the dismissal in Pacific
States concerned political responsibility within the national
government, not the state's obligation. Moreover,
justiciability is not a factor in attorneys general opinions, nor
in state court advisory opinions, which are not binding
adjudications. Could there be other reasons for dismissing
such claims in state courts? None that, in my view, survive
examination.
First, it is not a tenable theory that Article IV, Section 4,
of the U.S. Constitution is not law, or that it does not bind
state officials. Second, if the guarantee is called a "political
question" because the Constitution "textually commits"
national enforcement "to the United States," then the
Supremacy Clause even more clearly commits compliance
with the Constitution to the care of the states' judges.
Nor does the clause fail as law, in or out of courts, for
lack of discernible standards. The nature of republican
government long was central to American political theory.
State courts have not found themselves without persuasive
sources to decide claims that some governmental acts
departed from republican governance. The task for judges is
affd 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The significance of the affirmances is discussed below
at n. 23. See also Williams v. City of San Carlos, 43 Cal. Rptr. 486, 489 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1965).
17. See Iman v. Southern Pac. Co., 435 P.2d 851 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968); State
v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473 (Wash. 1996) ("assuming" that appellant's claim
against sentencing law is justiciable, he did not support the claim); Morrissey v.
State, 91 P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998) (coercing legislators' support for term limits
amendment).
18. See Baum v. Newbry, 267 P.2d 220 (Or. 1954) (secretary of state's power
to redistrict if court invalidates legislature's plan).
19. See State v. Montez, 789 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1990) (initiative placing death
penalty in the constitution, beyond legislative change).
20. See State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145 (Or. 1997)
(requiring legislative supermajority to change sentencing laws approved by
voters).
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not to define "republican government" as a Platonic form but
to recognize when a particular feature is not republican.
State courts, one hopes, would have no trouble-at least, no
intellectual trouble-in concluding that the decrees of a
governor who declared martial law and canceled elections to
remain in power would not be republican lawmaking, even if
the state retained the form of a legislature in a powerless
assembly. They also might recognize a failure of republican
government if the governor or legislature could reverse any
judgment of a court or remove any judge as they pleased-not
unprecedented elsewhere.
2. Developing State Jurisprudence on Republican
Government
State judges may feel at a loss how to decide, and lawyers
how to brief, a federal text in the absence of Supreme Court
cases and opinions. But if the state's own constitution
guaranteed that it would forever maintain a republican form
of government, I doubt that the state's courts would profess
themselves unable to analyze and apply that provision. Yet
California's situation is the same. As I have said, the
national requirement that all states maintain republican
governments legally makes this duty a part of every state's
constitution, and courts should apply it as such.
Suppose that a state changed its constitution and
empowered its governor to impose criminal punishment on
violations of executive orders, or to determine the
government's financial needs and to levy taxes on such
income or property and at such rates as the governor deemed
necessary to meet those needs. Would a court be unable to
discern that this is not republican government-even if the
governor acted in full compliance with due process, equality,
and other individual rights? If a state court did hold such a
gubernatorial power 'nonrepublican,' would anyone expect the
U.S. Supreme Court to hold that the court exceeded its
jurisdiction? The Kansas court in Van Sickle v. Shanahan"'
readily tackled and disposed of a somewhat different claim
against a governor's power to change existing law.
The fact assumed in my question-that the challenged
act complies with all other constitutional guarantees-
suggests why lawyers and courts neglect the guarantee of
21. 511 P.2d 223, 235 (Kan. 1973).
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republican government. Petitioners for relief from some state
law generally can and do choose from a panoply of other
federal claims, most often under the Equal Protection Clause,
Due Process, or the First Amendment. With few conventional
sources for briefing a charge of non-republican action and
little encouragement to expect success, this claim appears
when the other claims seem slim. Judges, who are more
inclined to protect individual rights than to sit in judgment
on their states' governments, are likely to ignore such
republicanism claims when the law is vulnerable to a
conventional Fourteenth Amendment attack, and to dismiss
them without much analysis when the law otherwise passes
muster.
In two early state cases following the dismissal in Pacific
States, appellants nonetheless added Guarantee Clause
arguments to their clearly appealable Fourteenth
Amendment claims." The Supreme Court could not dismiss
these judgments, and it affirmed them. The Oregon court has
mistaken these results to imply that it lacked power to review
charges of non-republican actions as it had done three
generations earlier. 3 The best illustrations, however, are
found in Colorado.
In Evans v. Romer,24 challenging Colorado's amendment
against anti-discrimination laws for homosexuals, plaintiffs
argued that republican government, as understood in
Madison's time, precluded putting the rights of a distinctive
minority to the vote of a popular majority. Logically, a claim
that a law was not validly enacted needs to be answered
before reaching the substantive validity of the measure. But
this argument was not discussed in the Colorado court's
22. See State v. Mountain Timber Co., 135 P. 645, 649 (Wash. 1913);
Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 123 So. 664 (La. 1929).
23. See Huddleston, 932 P.2d. 1145. The majority opinion may have
overlooked that the 14th Amendment claims in these cases precluded dismissals
of the appeals in the U.S. Supreme Court, unlike the dismissal of the writ in
Pacific States. Two dissenters correctly read Pacific States to deal only with
federal jurisdiction. The modern Washington Supreme Court was more careful,
declining to decide its own authority because the issue had not been
satisfactorily briefed. See State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473 (Wash. 1996).
24. 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993). This historic theory of republican
lawmaking institutions also should have been raised against the 1964
California initiative barring anti-discrimination "open housing" laws, which
similarly was pushed to a five to four Supreme Court decision on equal
protection grounds. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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opinion, which preferred to debate the more familiar equal
protection issue on which a five to four majority in the U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the amendment.25
Later, however, the Colorado court found a violation of
republicanism in a law that it struck down on another
independent ground.26
In sum, the U.S. Constitution requires states to maintain
republican governments, and it directs state judges to ensure
compliance with the Constitution. State courts understood
this until the Supreme Court used the word "non-justiciable"
to deny its own responsibility within the U.S. Government for
enforcing the guarantee. In modern times, some state courts
have applied this denial to themselves, some have continued
to consider issues of republican government, and some have
admitted their uncertainty and wavered back and forth on
the issue. But it is wholly illogical to suggest that the U.S.
Constitution, which requires states to maintain republican
governments and swears state officials and judges to abide by
its terms, prevents state courts from reviewing their states'
adherence to republican processes. That view stands the
Constitution on its head.
Meanwhile, the present Supreme Court is looking at
ways to use the Guarantee Clause against federal laws."
Surely a disabled and dysfunctional government is not the
kind of republican state government that this novel
perspective seeks to preserve. But the Supreme Court is
unlikely to clarify the standards for state governments until a
state court actually finds some state action or process
incompatible with republican government. If state courts, for
insurance, couple such findings with some more familiar
basis for the same result, Supreme Court review may wait a
long time.
25. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
26. See Morrissey v. State, 91 P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998). In view of the second
basis for decision, the court thought it unnecessary to decide its authority to
enforce the Guarantee Clause.
27. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating federal
requirement that states "take title" to certain radioactive wastes as
"commandeering" state processes), the Court suggested that the justiciability of
Guarantee Clause claims was a complex issue that it did not need to decide in
that case.
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II. RELEVANCE FOR GOVERNMENT BY PLEBISCITE
So far we have focused on the state courts' duty to test
their state's adherence to republican means of governing.
That duty seems to have met with little objection when courts
have reviewed such challenges to executive power. How does
it relate to lawmaking by initiatives?
A. The Original Defense
It was by no means taken for granted a century ago that
initiatives were a republican form of lawmaking. It was an
obvious issue in the political as well as academic debates.28
When Oklahoma's constitutional convention proposed to copy
Oregon's newly adopted model of direct legislation, the
delegates were so concerned that the president and attorney
general would block Oklahoma's statehood that they left the
system optional until the state was safely admitted.29 The
issue was litigated at once after Oregon in 1902 adopted the
populist program of direct democracy.
In 1903, before any initiative had yet been circulated, the
Oregon Supreme Court stated its defense of the new system,
in Kadderly v. City of Portland." Other courts quickly cited
Kadderly as the answer to attacks on direct legislation in
their states. The California Supreme Court cited it in 1906 to
observe that the federal Guarantee Clause did not necessarily
confine initiatives to local uses.3' The Oklahoma and Kansas
courts relied on Kadderly's holding that the initiative and
referendum do not conflict with the Guarantee Clause.32
When the Pacific States Telephone Company later
challenged an initiated law, the Oregon court sustained the
28. See, e.g., W. A. Coutts, Is a Provision for the Initiative and Referendum
Inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States?, 6 MICH. L. REV. 304
(1908); Willis L. Hand, Is the Initiative and Referendum Repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States?, 58 CENT. L.J. 244 (1904); T.A. Sherwood,
The Initiative and Referendum under the United States Constitution, 56 CENT.
L.J. 247 (1903); Robert Henry, Deliberations About Democracy: Revolutions,
Republicanism, and Reform, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 533 (1998).
29. See Ex parte Wagner, 95 P. 435 (Okla. 1908) (referendum on a city
ordinance).
30. 74 P. 710 (Or. 1903), reh'g denied, 75 P. 222 (Or. 1904) (challenge to a
statute delaying the effective date of an ordinance so as to allow petitions for a
referendum).
31. See In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71 (1906).
32. See Wagner, 95 P. 435; State v. Board of Comm'rs, 144 P. 241 (Kan.
1914) (requiring city commissioners to enact a proposed ordinance or put it on
the ballot).
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initiative by simply referring to the views it stated five years
earlier in its Kadderly opinion." So we must review how that
opinion squared the initiative and referendum with a
republican form of government.
Recall that the court faced the question abstractly, before
either device had been used. Furthermore, the court rejected
an argument that the question was not justiciable.34 The
issue was cast as one of the state's architecture-either it was
republican or it was not. The court considered the effect of
plebiscites on the formal structure of government, not yet on
its functioning. The opinion acknowledged that one object of
the Guarantee Clause was to "prevent [the people] from
abolishing a republican form of government,"35 and that this
meant "a government administered by representatives chosen
or appointed by the people or their representatives. But,
the court found, Oregon's representative government
continued to exist. A referendum only gave voters the power
to withhold their assent to laws passed by those
representatives. "[T]he legislative and executive departments
are not destroyed"37 and initiated laws "may be amended or
repealed by the Legislature at will."" Moreover, initiated
laws remained subject to the same constitutional limitations
as other statutes.
In short, Kadderly postulated that republican
government meant government by elected representatives. It
defended lawmaking by plebiscite only to the extent that it
did not interfere with the continued authority of elected
representatives. This was the defense later cited by the
California, Oklahoma, and Kansas courts.39
33. State v. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co., 99 P. 427, 427-28 (Or. 1909).
34. See id. See also City of McMinniville v. Howenstine, 109 P. 81 (1910)
(challenging power delegated to cities). 'The federal constitution is a sufficient
guard against any legislative system that might become subversive of a
republican form of government, such as, for example, a perpetual surrender of
State sovereignty to the municipalities, etc.' Id.
35. Kadderly, 74 P. at 719.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 720.
38. Id.
39. Another Oregon judge phrased the defense in more populist rhetoric.
See Kiernan v. City of Portland, 111 P. 379 (Or. 1909). For a more detailed
discussion of the Oregon opinions, see Hans A. Linde, When Initiative
Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against
Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993).
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B. The Implications of the Kadderly Defense: Preserving
Representative Government
The Kadderly opinion did not fully explore all the
implications of Oregon's new system. It did not consider
initiated constitutional amendments or anticipate their use to
disarm the legislature's power to amend or repeal laws. In
1903, the debate was conducted in all-or-nothing terms, was
direct participation of voters in statewide lawmaking contrary
to a republican form of government or was it not?
Then and now, critics have been impatient with
distinctions," while supporters are satisfied with waving the
banner of democracy without considering the implications of
government without representation, or the record of other
regimes based on plebiscites. In its most simplistic form,
what can be un-American about putting any decision to a vote
of the people? Actually, American courts have not, and would
not, allow a popular vote on overriding their own
constitutional holdings,4 granting or denying a tavern
license, 2 or on admitting some identified residents to
citizenship while excluding others, as in Switzerland. 3
Judges now can rely on expansive notions of due process or
equal protection for such decisions, but before 1868 they
might well have invoked principles of "republican
government." Constitutional scholars and theorists also
question the claim of lawmaking by initiative to higher
40. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, "And to the Republic
for Which It Stands": Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057 (1996).
41. See People v. Max, 198 P. 150 (Colo. 1921) (referendum on decisions
invalidating laws).
42. See Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski 208 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000).
43. Under Swiss law, "regular naturalization falls exclusively under the
jurisdiction of the cantons and communes which may make further stipulations
and decide freely whether or not they wish to grant the alien cantonal and
communal citizenship and thus, Swiss citizenship." Embassy of Switzerland,
Washington D.C., Fact Sheet: The Swiss Citizenship Law (last modified Jan. 4,
2001) <http://www.swissemb.org/legal/html/swiss citizenshipjlaw.html>. In
2000, one community by referendum excluded Swiss residents of Balkan origin
from citizenship while admitting residents of Italian and other origins. See
Elizabeth Olson, Swiss Refusal of Citizenship to Immigrants Raises Debates,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2000, at A9.
44. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (principle that
legislative power is limited "flows from the very nature of our free Republican
governments" (emphasis added)); Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479 (Del. 1847).
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democratic credentials than lawmaking by representatives.45
By stating the test to be the preservation of a state's
representative government, Kadderly put the issue of its
displacement by initiatives-lawmaking without govern-
ment-on the right track. The opinion remains the best
foundation for further analysis by attorneys general as well
as by the courts.
Because my primary topic today is the judicial authority
to continue that analysis, I only suggest its general direction,
without going into detail. An incursion on representative
government can be invalid for distinct reasons. One is simply
logical; the Kadderly rationale does not allow lawmaking by
elected representatives to be placed below lawmaking by
plebiscites as if it were an inferior but regrettably necessary
substitute. 4' Republican government does not demand simple
majority votes. The designers of the U.S. Constitution,
themselves, required supermajority votes on a few important
issues. Elected representatives may propose such a
requirement for their own institution to the voters. But
without their participation, it is inconsistent with Kadderly's
premises to impose a higher barrier on elected lawmakers,
while allowing initiatives to be adopted by simple majorities
of whoever chooses to vote on them. The other, less simple,
test is substantive. Initiatives may not incapacitate the state
government from performing legally essential functions of a
state.
45. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421 (1998); Frank Michelman, Protecting the People from
Themselves, or How Direct Can Democracy Be? 45 UCLA L. REV. 1717 (1998);
Marci Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. Chi. L. Sch.
Roundtable 1 (1997).
46. This principle extends beyond initiating laws as constitutional
amendments, to provisions making it harder to change or repeal laws that have
been enacted by popular vote than laws enacted by the legislature and governor.
See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 33; cf. Luker v. Curtis, 136
P.2d 978 (Ida. 1943) (citing Kadderly); State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 932
P.2d 1145, 1172 (Or. 1997) (Durham, J., dissenting).
The designers of "republican government" rejected the view (embodied in
some post-Revolutionary state constitutions) that elected officials only act as
agents when voters cannot act directly. See Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and
Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship
Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477 (1994).
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1. Preserving Representative Lawmaking
The Kadderly opinion allowed voters to share in the
state's legislative power, by initiatives as well as by
referenda, only as long as the representative legislature
retains the power to change, repeal, or reenact laws. This
means that ordinary laws may not be put beyond legislative
reach, by placing them in the state's constitution or by other
special obstacles to later legislative action.
By "ordinary laws" I mean laws that govern private
relationships or conduct or impose burdens or penalties on
private persons, as distinct from directing how government
should be organized and conducted or limiting its powers.
Kadderly's test does not prevent initiating amendments that
change governmental structures, or elections, or define
private rights, for instance, the procedural rights of crime
victims against government acts. It does not prevent
initiating measures to enact criminal penalties or taxes. But
the test does prevent initiatives to put taxes or sentencing
laws beyond legislative change, even if the drafters phrased a
punishment as a "victim's right."
This distinction is not new. The drafters of early state
constitutions, including Oregon's in 1857, basically
understood and followed it, with some exceptions.47 After
Oregon allowed initiatives to propose "laws" and
"amendments to the Constitution," the new system's populist
sponsors long adhered to the distinction, proposing ordinary
laws for private conduct and addressing constitutional
initiatives only to government.48 The telephone tax at issue in
Pacific States was initiated as a law; had it been initiated as a
47. California's views in this respect changed from the 1849 convention's
selection of familiar constitutional features to the policies pursued in the 1879
convention. See Harry N. Scheiber, Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical
Perspective on the 1879 California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35
(1989).
First, in the view of nearly all critics, the 1879 document was too much
a collection of detailed and highly specified codes that would better
have been left to ordinary legislation.... Ironically, any gains made in
1970 by purging the document of excessive detail and of provisions
more properly "legislative" have been more than overbalanced since
then by the profligate use and often devastating effects of the modern
direct ballot for constitutional revision.
Id. at 48.
48. The history is set out in David B. Frohnmayer & Hans A. Linde,
Initiating "Laws" in the Form of "Constitutional Amendments": An Amicus
Curiae Brief, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 749, 759-63 (1998).
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constitutional amendment it could not have been sustained
by the Oregon court's simple citation to Kadderly.49
2. Preserving the State's Ability to Function as a State
Recent initiatives, starting with California's 1978
Proposition 13, have sought amendments to restrict
particular taxes or overall levels of public spending." Other
initiatives impose obligatory expenditures without providing
a new source of revenue. Because government operates by
spending money, this use of initiated amendments poses a
distinctive threat to representative government. Standing
alone, a limitation on taxing property may merely compel a
state to turn to some other tax, on incomes, sales, or gross
receipts, until precluded by new amendments, and forced
spending on prisons or pensions may only compel a state to
reduce or abandon other programs. But if initiatives may
entrench tax limitations and spending programs in the
constitution, they could potentially reduce the elected
government to allocating the small change left to its
legislature."
This troubling implication led the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in 1991 to question whether an initiative to require
referenda on most revenue bills departed from representative
government.52 A legislature without the means to govern and
reduced to debating the choice of the state song or flower
would not qualify. The Oklahoma court allowed the
amendment, declining to assume that the voters would defeat
49. See supra text accompanying note 31. The distinction applies toinitiated amendments, not to amendments referred to the voters by the
legislature. Fiscal, bonding, and other constraints in state constitutions often
require legislatures to refer an amendment in order to enact and dedicate a
revenue source to specific purposes in a form beyond legislative change. That
decision, however, is proposed by the representative lawmakers themselves, not
imposed upon them.
50. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (replacing a flawed initiative), and §
11(b)-(e) (1997) (totaling 132 column-inches of details in the constitution).
51. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected a claim that the legislature could not
repeal an initiated statute in this grant of state pensions to senior citizens
because initiatives "come[ directly from the people." Luker v. Curtis, 136 P.2d978, 979 (Idaho 1943). If a series of initiatives can place such mandated
expenditures directly in the constitution or otherwise beyond legislative control,
along with initiated tax limitations, as can happen in California, the
implications for the state government's ability to function are obvious.
52. See In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d 772, (Okla. 1991).Quoting Kadderly, the court stated the "dispositive question" to be whether the
amendment would cause "a loss of representative government." Id. at 780.
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the revenue bills referred to them. In fact, the federal
Constitution does not mandate many state-funded functions
beyond conducting elections, not even for roads, schools, or
police. The Constitution does, however, presuppose that
states have functioning legislatures and courts.53 Perhaps
judges might find that an initiative amendment that cut
funding for courts by ninety percent, or destroyed judicial
independence by allowing the governor or legislature to
replace judges at will, or subjected judges to annual political
elections, went too far to be a republican government.54
3. Distinguishing Non-Republican Substance from Non-
Republican Process
It remains to be distinguished whether or not the
substance of a measure or the use of an initiative to enact it is
non-republican. If a measure would destroy an aspect of
republican government in the state, it does not matter
whether the measure is adopted by the legislature, by a
referral to the voters, or upon initiative petitions. State laws
differ on whether the apparent invalidity of a measure should
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 3; and art. VI, cls. 2-3.
54. The essence of political decision is whether and how to levy taxes,
allocate funds, and make new laws. If one postulates that courts are a
necessary element of a republican government, the issue is how a state
distinguishes judges who apply law in adjudications from those political officers
who exist to make such political decisions, and who periodically compete for
elective office with promises to "represent" and to advocate the interests of their
constituents, in campaigns marked by the political methods of partisan
nomination, funding by competing interests, and competing promises of
favorable actions in office. To the extent that a state's laws allow for little or no
distinction between elected political officials and independent courts in these
respects, courts might question such laws as potentially inconsistent with
republican government. See Hans A. Linde, The Judge as Political Candidate,
40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 17 (1992).
Aside from the general politicization of courts serving for relatively short
terms after competitive, sometimes partisan, campaigns funded by those
interested in judicial decisions, a rather remarkable debate concerns whether
judges should treat constitutional flaws in initiated laws more leniently than in
the same laws adopted by legislatures. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the
Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of
Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133 (1997) (electoral reprisals
threaten judicial function in controversial issues); Craig B. Holman & Robert
Stern, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and
Federal Courts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1239 (1998); Richard L. Hasen, Judging
the Judges of Initiatives: A Comment on Holman and Stern, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1267 (1998); Michael Vitiello & Andrew J. Glendon, Article III Judges and
the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1275 (1998).
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keep it off the ballot.55 There are good arguments both for
and against an early determination. But it is not unusual for
election officers or courts to decide that a proposed initiative
or referral does not qualify as a proper ballot measure
because it concerns an administrative act, does not propose a
law, contains unrelated subjects, or is a revision rather than
an amendment.
The Kadderly test of preserving representative
government would allow some measures to be referred by a
legislature that could not be imposed by an initiative.
Elsewhere I have set out another reason why an initiative
may not be a legitimate process for a measure although it
might be valid if enacted by elected representatives.56 The
drafters of the Guarantee Clause feared lawmaking upon
popular "passions" and "interest" in the states as much as any
improbable revival of monarchy, and they designed
"republican" institutions to forestall this.57 Understanding
those terms should preclude initiatives aimed at identifiable
minorities, ad hominem, regardless whether the measure
would be invalid if passed by those institutions.
55. Compare Stan P. Geurin, Comment, Pre-Election Judicial Review: The
Right Choice, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 221, 221 n.6 (1992), with William
Lewton Teague, Jr., Pre-Election Constitutional Review of Initiative Petitions: A
Pox on Vox Populi?, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 201 (1992). The choice concerns
only whether the apparent substantive invalidity of a measure should disqualify
it; nothing speaks for putting measures that do not qualify as proper initiatives
or referrals on the ballot. The Oklahoma Supreme Court split on the issue of
whether a non-enforceable policy statement demanding congressional termlimits could be either a law or initiated as a constitutional amendment. See In
re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1996) (holding measure
ineligible).
56. See Linde, supra note 39.
57. See id. at 32-38 (setting out the 18th century significance of these
terms). A strongly held conviction about a public policy, whether in favor of thedeath penalty or against a sales tax, is not a "passion":
"Passion" describes, not how strongly one supports a measure but why
one supports it. The most obvious (though not all) collective passions
appeal to a communal judgment of inclusion and exclusion based on
nationality, race, or religious convictions-to ad hominem
preconceptions like those condemned as "invidious" in equal protection
doctrine.
Linde, supra note 54, at 35. "Interest" referred to personal, mainly financial,
self-interest. In a financial depression this should, for instance, prevent debtors
from initiating a debt relief law for themselves of the kind that the Supreme
Court allowed representative government to adopt in the overall public interest.
See Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); see also
Linde, supra note 39.
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C. Resolving the "Justiciability" Muddle
We return to the issue of responsibility for the
lawmaking process. All public officials are responsible for
governing by republican means, with or without direction by
the courts. But some elected officials see career opportunities
in sponsoring initiative campaigns, leading "the people"
against their fellow representatives. Others share the
ambivalence of their constituents toward lawmaking without
government. They decry the destructive force of measures
they oppose, while turning to initiatives when their
representative institutions block their own policies. In
politics, shifting goals often have priority over systemic
principles. 8 This persistent ambivalence underscores the
importance of recognizing the constitutional line between
initiating easy-to-change laws and placing laws beyond
legislative change.
That line brings the responsibility back to the state
courts. An act taken by non-republican means is
unconstitutional in the most profound sense, with or without
judicial review, but reliance on courts to decide legal issues
has become so deeply ingrained that anything that courts will
not review is thought not to be law at all. And surely review
by appellate courts, with their wider and longer perspective,
is preferable to leaving legal issues to the unreviewable
decisions of short-term political officials.
Oregon's attorney general has stated that he would not
approve ballot measures that failed the test of republican
lawmaking, though he would first seek clarification whether
courts would review such decisions if appealed.59 Clarification
may be a long time coming, if it must wait for a case in which
58. A telling example is found in the recurring debates over requiring a
prescribed level of participation to pass a measure (e.g. "double-majority"
requirements), which are attacked as thwarting democracy by majority rule or
defended as securing a truly representative majority, depending on the
speaker's attitude toward the measure at issue. See Hans A. Linde, Taking
Oregon's Initiative Toward a New Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 391, 403
(1998).
59. See Hardy Myers, The Guarantee Clause and Direct Democracy, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659 (1998). Myers used the example of the 1922 Oregon
measure allowing only public schools, which was initiated under the leadership
of the Ku Klux Klan in order to destroy Catholic schools. It was invalidated in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Other examples would be
various initiatives in California, Colorado, Washington, and elsewhere to
overturn rights that lawmakers had extended to racial minorities, homosexuals,
or non-citizen immigrants.
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a court faces a plausible claim to void a successful initiative
measure on grounds that it fails the test for republican
lawmaking that the court cannot void on other grounds.
Until recently, state courts have found ways to evade that
confrontation." Is another approach available?
In the few states that provide for advisory opinions, the
justices have proceeded to analyze questions of republican
government on the merits.6' Other states generally allow
legislators and other officials to obtain a formal opinion from
their attorney general. If an attorney general is formally
asked whether a state is or is not bound to maintain
republican government the answer cannot be in doubt. Nor
can one doubt the answer to a second question, whether this
duty in principle binds officials who act for the state,
including legislators, governors, and election officers.62 The
state's chief election officer may not put a measure on the
ballot if doing so would be incompatible with republican
government. When would it be incompatible? In the absence
of judicial or congressional guidance, that legal advice would
have to come from the attorney general.63 A legislature itself
could resolve by law that republican government depends on
preserving the lawmaking capacity of elected
representatives-the Kadderly premise-and direct state
officials to judge measures accordingly, although they could
not resolve the opposite.
Also, state laws provide for petitions for adoption of
administrative rules.64 Once it is understood that in principle
initiatives must meet standards of republican lawmaking,
there is a good case for seeking to formulate those standards
60. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993); Atiyeh v. State of
Oregon, 918 P.2d 795 (1996) (calling plaintiffs' claim "moot" because unrelated
parties succeeded in voiding the measure on other grounds, though plaintiffs
had asked for future relief and had no interest in the measure's merits). The
recent exception was Morrissey v. State, 91 P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998).
61. See, e.g., State v. Lehtola, 198 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 1972) (powers of district
attorneys); In re Interrogatories Propounded by the Senate Concerning House
Bill 1078, 536 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1975) (validity of judicial role in redistricting).
62. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
63. One could imagine an assertion, on a false analogy to the Supreme
Court's deferring to the federal political branches, that the state legislature
decides what is or is not republican government. See Iman v. Southern Pac. Co.,
435 P.2d 851 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968). But the state legislature cannot have the
last word on compliance with a legal requirement of the U.S. Constitution.
64. See UNIF. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 3-117,
U.L.A. (1981).
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in advance by means of a rule-making proceeding. Election
officers might prefer to be thrown into a hornets' nest, but
may a few published standards not serve them better than
facing continual battles with the proponents or opponents of
specific measures? Moreover, once adopted, courts in turn
could review the standards like other rules, divorced from the
political struggle over a specific ballot measure.
Would it be wise to try such an approach to defining the
constitutional boundaries of lawmaking without government?
The legal means exist; readiness to act is another matter, as I
said at the outset. My role here is to offer a legal analysis,
not political advice.
Scholarship on direct legislation must move beyond
asking whether "the initiative" is consistent with republican
government, and beyond disposing of the question with a
citation to Pacific States without reading the analysis in
Kadderly that Pacific States left undisturbed. Under
Kadderly, the primary target is not initiatives as such but the
entrenchment of laws beyond the reach of regular lawmaking.
A modern court's answer may depend on the degree to which
the court has become concerned with the impact of such
entrenched initiatives on the ongoing conduct and the long-
run capacity of representative government. Maybe such a
concern lies behind the recent turn to invalidating initiative
amendments for formal defects, as "revisions," or as
containing multiple subjects or multiple amendments.65
65. See, e.g., Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49 (Or. 1998) (invalidating
measure amending multiple constitutional guarantees in criminal cases);
Kurrus v. Priest, 29 S.W.3d 669 (Ark. 2000). While this article was in
preparation, the Washington courts invalidated an initiated measure reducing
automobile license fees and another initiative rolling back taxes and fees
adopted without voter approval See Oliver Staley, Judge strikes down
Initiative 722: Tax-limit measure addressed more than one issue (Feb. 24, 2001)
<httpJ/www.spokesmanreview.com/news-story.asp?date=22401&ID=s925836>.
Also, an Oregon court invalidated an initiated amendment requiring
compensation when a regulation reduces value of real property. See McCall v.
Kitzhaber, No. OOC-19871 (Marion County Cir. Ct. Feb. 2001). The reason
given in every case was one or more formal flaws that sponsors with time can
learn to avoid. "Since the 1970s... half the [legal] challenges have resulted in
the initiative being invalidated in part or in whole." RICHARD J. ELLIS,
DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA (forthcoming
2002). In a 1999 review of prior cases, Kenneth P. Miller discerned a shift from
an "accommodationist" to a "watchdog" judicial stance in California, Colorado,
and Oregon, especially after Colorado adopted a "single subject" requirement for
initiatives in 1994. See Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of Courts in the Initiative
Process: A Search for Standards (paper delivered at the 1999 annual meeting of
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These formal tests are no easier to clarify, are often less
pertinent to the real problem, and are less useful in the long
run than the test of preserving representative government.
Yet, the recent decisions suggest that courts no longer believe
that overturning an initiated law outrages most voters.
Maybe the answer depends on who else in the state shares
the concern with the larger systemic issue and is prepared to
present the arguments for its judicial resolution." So far,
negation or avoidance may have seemed the courts' most
convenient and politically safe course.
If an attorney general or a court really wants to learn
whether the federal Constitution precludes state court review
for republican means of governance, it is unlikely either will
find out by declining to enforce that constitutional duty and
leaving it to the challenger to gain certiorari from the
Supreme Court on the jurisdictional issue. More promising,
as well as more principled, is to act on a well-founded claim
that some proposed action or measure would be incompatible
the American Political Science Association).
Miller notes that the state's lawyers are expected to defend ballot measures
even if attorneys general believe them to be invalid (though the opposite can be
argued, in my view), and he states that "courts stand virtually alone in filtering
the initiative process" and recommends some form of non-judicial procedure for
pre-election disqualification of invalid initiatives so as to reduce the political
burden on courts. But who will voluntarily assume that burden, unless a court
finds that it is required by law? Perhaps sponsors of questionable initiatives
should have to defend the validity of an initiative for themselves, if an attorney
general formally explains the basis for declining to do so. See Senate v. Jones,
21 Cal. 4th 1142 (1999) (pre-election disqualification of initiative under
California Constitution's single subject rule); Gerald F. Uelmen, Handling Hot
Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives after Senate v. Jones, 41
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999 (2001).
66. In Atiyeh v. State of Oregon, 918 P.2d 795 (1996), the case against
initiating an ordinary law as a constitutional amendment was presented by a
group including two former Oregon governors, the Mayor of Portland (a former
Speaker of the House), two former judges of the Oregon Supreme Court, and
other past and present officials, who disclaimed any personal interest in the
substance of the disputed measure. The case was dismissed as moot when the
measure was invalidated on debatable federal grounds in a related suit. See
Frohnmayer & Linde, supra note 48, at 750-51.
More often, given the modern use of initiatives, claims of non-republican
lawmaking have been raised, not by telephone companies or the Society of
Sisters, but by public defenders against the death penalty and other sentencing
laws constitutionalized upon populist initiatives. See, e.g., State v. Wagner, 752
P.2d 1136, 1197 n.8 (Or. 1988) (Linde, J., dissenting); State v. Montez, 789 P.2d
1352 (Or. 1990); State v. Manussier, 951 P.2d 473 (Wash. 1996). Also, groups
defending the political rights of homosexuals seeking legislative protection have
raised the claim. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
2001] STATE COURTS & REPUBLICAN GOV'T
with republican government, leaving it to the proponents to
persuade the Supreme Court that the state may not secure
republicanism by its own courts. No matter how the question
is presented, Californians should know that their own
supreme court, without overruling itself, can follow the
implications of the Kadderly analysis that it cited in its first
defense of the popular initiative,67 if the court is called upon to
do so.
67. See In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71 (1906).
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